A Current Look at Foreign Cartels and the United States Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act by Rogers, C. Paul, III.
 
 
Competition Law Chronicle 
A Centre for Competition and Regulation Newsletter 
The National Law School Centre for Competition and Regulation  
(CCR) has been instituted with the intention of providing research,  
training and consultation in the area of competition law and  
economic regulation. It aims to bring together various 
stakeholders such as regulators, academicians, practitioners 
and industry to provide for better understanding and  
critical thinking of current law and policy. Efficient  
and timely law, policy and its enforcement is a  
crucial driver of economic growth and the  
centre is driven by these  
concerns. 
In this Issue                                         Page No.  
Foreword……………………………………………….III 
Editorial Note …………………………….. ………….IV 
A Current Look at Foreign Cartels and the United 
States    Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements 
Act……………………………………………………. .VI 
Prof. C. Paul Rogers III 
High Technology, Internet Based Start-Ups and Com-
petition Law Enforcement in India……….…………..X 
Prof. Dr. T.S.Somashekar  
Ola at the CCI: Is there are “free ride” problem?.....XIV 
Mr. Yaman Verma  
E-commerce Companies  - Is their a case of Competi-
tion Regulation? ……………………………………XIX 
Ms. Nayantara Ravichandran    
Anayzing the CCI’s use of Economic, Circumstantial 
and Direct Evidence ………………………………XXIII 
Mr. Victor Leong S.  
2015-2016                                                                                                                  Vol. II(1) 
VI 
 
The United States‘ Foreign Trade An-
titrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), en-
acted in 1982, is designed to set the 
framework for determining if  and 
when U.S. antitrust laws have jurisdic-
tion over anticompetitive conduct in-
volving commerce foreign to the Unit-
ed States.1  While excluding U.S. im-
port commerce from its reach, it seeks 
to both clarify and limit the extraterri-
torial application of  U.S. antitrust 
laws, perhaps in partial deference to 
foreign concerns about the reach of  
those laws to competitive conduct 
abroad. It is far, however, from an ex-
ample of  clarity in drafting.2  The U.S. 
Court of  Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit has described it as a ―web of  
words‖3 while the Third Circuit noted 
that it was ―inelegantly phrased.‖4   
The U.S. Supreme Court has consid-
ered the applicability of  the FTAIA 
only in its 2004 F. Hoffman-LaRoche 
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. decision.5   The 
case involved a world-wide vitamin 
price fixing scheme which, it was al-
leged, caused higher vitamin prices in 
the U.S. as well as other countries such 
as Ecuador.  The Court ruled that U.S. 
purchasers could bring a Sherman Act 
claim under the FTAIA but that buy-
ers in other countries could not since 
their harm was foreign to the United 
States.  In interpreting the statute, the 
Court held that the act sets forth a 
general rule placing all non-import ac-
tivity involving foreign commerce out-
side of  the reach of  the Sherman Act.  
But, the Court noted, the act ―brings 
such conduct back within the Sher-
man Act‘s reach if  the restraint at is-
sue has a ―direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable‖ anticompetitive 
impact on U.S. commerce.6 
Litigation involving the FTAIA has 
spiked in the last decade or so as the 
U.S. Department of  Justice (DOJ) has 
increasingly prosecuted foreign-based 
cartels, spurring many coattail civil 
lawsuits in addition.  In a number of  
investigations, the DOJ has targeted 
foreign suppliers of  component parts 
that were incorporated by other com-
panies into finished products assem-
bled overseas but later imported for 
sale to U.S. customers.  Leading exam-
ples include TFT-LCD panels for fin-
ished products such as televisions, 
A CURRENT LOOK AT FOREIGN CARTELS AND THE 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST IM-
PROVEMENTS ACT  
Prof. C. Paul Rogers III# 
1 15 U.S.C. §6a. 
2 See e.g. C. Paul Rogers III, Cross-Border Mergers and Antitrust: 
Jurisdiction, Enforcement and Cooperation Issues, in Cross-Border 
Mergers and Acquisitions and the Law (Norbert Horn, ed. 
2001), 361, n.10.   
3 United States v. Hui Hsiung, No. 12-10492, 2015 WL 400550, 
at *9 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2015), amending 758 F.3d 1074 (9th 
Cir. 2014).  
4 Carpet Group Int’l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 
69 (3d Cir. 2000).  
5 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 




have applied the statute inconsistently.  
For example, the Ninth Circuit has 
held that ―direct‖ under the statute 
means ―as an immediate conse-
quence‖ with no ―intervening devel-
opments.‖11  In contrast, the Second 
and Seventh Circuits have rejected the 
Ninth Circuit‘s test, instead defining 
direct as having a ―reasonable proxi-
mate cause nexus.‖12    
The nexus test has proven difficult to 
apply and one group of  commenta-
tors has argued that in practice it often 
devolves ―into subjective metaphysical 
analysis.‖13 But with respect to com-
ponent part cartels, there is always the 
argument that effects on U.S. Com-
merce are not direct where a price 
fixed component is incorporated over-
seas into a finished product that is 
eventually imported into the United 
States.  Thus, under either test, a U.S. 
plaintiff  suing a foreign component 
part cartel cannot be assured that it 
can meet FTAIA requirements. 
The FTAIA‘s seemingly intractability is 
perhaps best illustrated by the recent 
Motorola litigation before the Seventh 
Circuit.  It involved claims based on 
foreign sales of  price-fixed LCD pan-
els incorporated into cellphones that 
were then imported into the United 
States.  In earlier litigation the DOJ 
had alleged that the overcharges on 
notebook computers, and cell phones 
and various parts assemblies used to 
make automobiles.   
Often at issue is whether the foreign 
component cartel had the required 
―direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect‖ on US commerce.7  
The DOJ‘s position in those cases is 
typically that U.S. consumers were 
harmed because inflated cartel prices 
for the components paid for abroad 
were incorporated into higher prices 
for the finished products that were 
sold in the United States.8  It is con-
cerned, however, that interpretations 
of  the FTAIA that preclude the Sher-
man Act from reaching foreign com-
ponent part cartels unduly limit its 
ability to protect U.S. consumers from 
competitive harm.9  
Although lower courts have been 
mindful of  the Supreme Court‘s ad-
monition that Congress intended that 
the FTAIA ―clarify, perhaps to limit, 
but not to expand in any significant 
way, the Sherman Act‘s scope as ap-
plied to foreign commerce,‖10  they 
7 Other frequently recurring issues arising under the FTAIA 
include (1) whether, assuming a direct effect on U.S. com-
merce, that effect ―gives rise to‖ the plaintiff‘s Sherman Act 
claim (Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162), and (2) whether the for-
eign cartel conduct directly involves U.S. import commerce 
and thus is excluded from the requirements of the statute 
by its express terms.  See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 
F.3d 845, 855-56 (7th Cir. 2012). 
8 Leon B. Greenfield, Steven F. Cherry, Perry A. Lange, and 
Jacquelyn L. Stanley, Foreign Component Cartels and the U.S. 
Antitrust Laws: A First Principle Approach, Antitrust (Spring 
2015), 18. 
9 Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Panel Reh‘g or Reh‘g En Banc at 10, Motorola 
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. 
Apr. 24, 2014), 2014 WL 1878995, at *10.83 F.3d 845, 856-
57 (7th Cir. 2012).  
10 Id. at 169. 
11Huising, No 12-10514, slip op. at 40; United States v. LSL 
Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2004). 
12 See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 
410 (2d Cir. 2014) and Minn-Chem, at 856-57.  
13 Greenfield, et. al, at 21. 
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those panels entering the U.S. exceed-
ed $500 million.14   
In Motorola I the court first held that 
the targeted conduct did not have a 
direct effect on U.S. commerce, but 
subsequently vacated the opinion.15  
Then in Motorola II the same panel re-
versed itself  on the direct effect test, 
holding that if  prices of  the compo-
nents were fixed, the effect on U.S. 
commerce would meet the test for 
purposes of  the FTAIA.16  But it fo-
cused additionally on the second do-
mestic effects question under the stat-
ute – whether, assuming a direct effect 
on U.S. commerce, those effects give 
rise ―to an antitrust cause of  action 
under the Sherman Act.‖17  In doing 
so, it held that the FTAIA precluded 
plaintiff ‘s claims because the domestic 
effect of  a conspiracy to fix compo-
nent part prices did not ―give rise‖ to 
a Sherman Act claim.  The court rea-
soned that although the domestic ef-
fect of  the conspiracy was increased 
cell phone prices in the U.S., that is 
not what harmed the plaintiff, which 
was a wholly owned foreign subsidiary 
of  the American parent company.18  It 
had purchased the price fixed compo-
nents directly from the conspirators 
abroad.   According to the court, its 
harm was suffered abroad when it 
purchased the price-fixed panels 
abroad, but that harm was not de-
pendent on the domestic effect of  in-
creased cell phone prices.19    
In support of  its holding, the Motorola 
II court referenced the Supreme 
Court‘s concern expressed in Em-
pagran about the risk of  excessive ex-
traterritorial application of  U.S. law 
interfering ―with a foreign nation‘s 
ability independently to regulate its 
own affairs.‖20  Of  course, that con-
cern for international comity is a 
prime motivation for the FTAIA it-
self.21 The proof  is in the pudding, 
however.  That is, it is the American 
courts which are left with the task of  
interpreting and applying an admitted-
ly poorly drafted and confusing stat-
ute.  As such, it seems that they are 
the ultimate purveyors of  comity.  
Part of  the judicial function of  course 
is to provide guidance and predictabil-
ity.  But with the circuit split after 
Motorola II, there is currently little of  
14See Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. AU 
OptronicsCorp., No. 12-10492 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2013). 
15Motorola Mobility LLC. v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola I), 
746 F.3d 842, 844-45 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014) (Posner, J.), 
vacated and rehearing granted, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 120704 
(7th Cir. July 1, 2014). 
16Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 
775 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2015). 
17Id. at 820.  
18 Motorola argued that it functioned with its subsidiaries as 
a single enterprise, but the court ruled them legally distinct 
and that it could not pretend that its foreign subsidiaries 
were divisions rather than subsidiaries.  Id. at 822. 
19 Id. at 820.  The court also held that Motorola‘s claims did 
not fall within the import trade exception to the FTAIA, 
since Motorola, not the defendants, were the importers of 
the price-fixed goods.  Id. at 818.  This holding conflicts 
with the Ninth Circuit, which held that the fact that the 
defendants were not themselves ―importers‖ was immateri-
al.  Huising, 2015 WL 400550, at *14. 
20 Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 824 (quoting Empagran, 542 U.S. at 
165). 
21 Ellen Meriwether, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA: If Not 
Here, Then Where?, Antitrust, Spring 2015, 13. 21 Further, 
Motorola II‘s restriction of the reach of the FTAIA‘s import 
exception adds another potential layer of defense for for-
eign cartels.  See note 19, supra, and Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 
818. 
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Nonetheless Motorola II has limited the 
reach of  Sherman Act claims to for-
eign component part cartels.  But that 
case may have created a circuit split 
and it is far from clear how other cir-
cuits might handle the same type of  
claim.  On June 15, 2015, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in both 
Motorola II and the Ninth Circuit‘s 
Hsiung case, so we are not going to get 
a definitive answer anytime soon. 
Motorola II may have shifted the focus 
to the domestic effects analysis and 
away from the direct effects require-
ment, which could perhaps soften the 
supposed circuit spit since the FTAIA 
requires both.  As a result, it may be 
that in declining to hear the case, the 
Supreme Court did not see a circuit 
split.26  
In any event, judicial application of  
the FTAIA seems to have produced 
more questions than answers.  While 
ideally the law should create certainty, 
the combination of  an unartfully 
drafted statute, differing judicial inter-
pretations of  that statute, and the 
somewhat amorphous concept of  
comity all combine to produce a great 
deal of  uncertainty about the applica-
tion of  the FTAIA to foreign compo-
nent part cartels. 
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either for cases involving component 
part price-fixing abroad.  Motorola II 
certainly restricts the reach of  U.S. an-
titrust laws to those conspiracies and 
adds additional hurdles for the DOJ 
and private plaintiffs seeking relief  for 
domestic harms.  In addition to the 
direct and substantial effects require-
ment, plaintiffs must be prepared to 
meet a narrow, restrictive ―domestic 
effects‖ test to satisfy the FTAIA.22 
But before one asserts that Motorola II 
has effectively swept away all U.S. anti-
trust claims against foreign compo-
nent part price-fixers, it is important 
to remember the Supreme Court‘s ad-
monition in Empagran that it matters 
who the plaintiff  is.23 For example, if  
Motorola had made its purchase deci-
sions and executed purchase orders in 
the U.S. rather than abroad through a 
foreign subsidiary, the result might 
have been different.24 Further, the 
DOJ, while is concerned about the ef-
fect of  cases like Motorola II on its 
ability to criminally prosecute foreign 
based component part cartels, has typ-
ically asserted jurisdiction through the 
FTAIA‘s import commerce excep-
tion.25 
22 542 U.S. at 170-71. 
23 In that instance, the goods would have been import com-
merce and thus presumably within the FTAIA‘s import 
exception but whether the ―gives rise to‖ domestic effect 
standard under Motorola II would be satisfied is still ques-
tionable. 
24 In that instance, the goods would have been import com-
merce and thus presumably within the FTAIA‘s import 
exception but whether the ―gives rise to‖ domestic effect 
standard under Motorola II would be satisfied is still ques-
tionable  
25 Hsiung, No. 12-10514, slip op. 35-36. 
26 The U.S. Supreme Court does not give its reasons for 
denying a petition for certiorari.  
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